Wednesday, 24 June 2015

" Provocation of the Korean War by US Imperialism" extract fromUS IMPERIALISTS STARTED THE KOREAN WAR

 Provocation of the Korean War by US Imperialism

Silence before the Storm

"Let’s start war in Korea"-this was an unalterable policy of the US gov­ernment. In accordance with this predetermined policy the war plan was given a definite shape in top secrecy and, entering 1950, the war preparations pro­ceeded at the finishing stage.
As John Osborn, Life correspondent to south Korea, wrote that "never before in our history had we been so nearly prepared at the start of any war as we were at the start of this war",*l the United States had never displayed so great trickery and prepared arms so fully as in the Korean war in its history of overseas aggression marked by swindling and fraud, threats and blackmail.
Everything went according to their plan. But they deemed it necessary to make assurance doubly sure, and thought it was important above all to invent some plausible pretexts before kindling war.
With this in view, they formed some designs to veil their aggressive nature and lay the blame for war at the Republic’s door. The first design was to "convince" the world of the fact that Korea’s "security" had nothing to do with US security and that the US was not interested in Korea.
Hence the US rulers started booming that Korea was of no strategic value in the Far Eastern policy of the United States. A typical instance of it was pro­vided by US State Secretary Acheson who declared on January 12, 1950 at the Federal Club that the US defence line in the Far East ran from the Aleutians to the Loochoos through Japan proper and then from the Loochoos to the Philip­pines, thus deliberately setting south Korea aside. And he evidently hinted at south Korea and Taiwan when he said that as for the security of the countries outside this defence line no one could guarantee them against military attack. In this way he tried to give an impression that it was not the US policy to "defend" south Korea. *2 Then Connally, Chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, made a statement to the effect that Korea was not on the
"foremost defence line" of the United States. Meanwhile, Truman, in his policy statement on January 5, said that the US government was not inclined to follow the line of meddling in the civil war of China. He even declared for the so-called "policy of nonintervention in Taiwan", that is, a policy of not giving any military aid or advice to the Chiang Kai-shek troops of Taiwan.*3 The Ameri­can rulers also stressed, time and again, that the United States would refrain from officially participating in any regional military alliance in Asia including the Pacific Treaty Organization.
At that time no small number of the world public were dazed by a string of such statements let out by the US rulers from the outset of 1950. Some even nearly believed the United States would really take its hands off south Korea and Taiwan. But many others still greatly doubted those statements issued at the time when they were loud-mouthed about the "crisis of Asia" and the "threat of southward invasion". They tried to take a look into the shady side of that "defence line" statement.
A gimlet in a bag shows itself. The hypocritic nature of those statements soon came into the open. They were an anaesthetic to benumb the vigilance of the world public, the Korean and Chinese peoples in particular, over the US war policy and a smokescreen to cover up their war provocation plan. One year before, MacArthur announced that "today the Pacific Ocean... is a lake of the Anglo-Saxons"*4 and even made a secret promise, saying: "I will defend south Korea as I would defend the shores of my own native land."*5 Acheson himself could not conceal his real intention in the latter part of the above-said speech. Stressing that the claim for giving up aid to south Korea and the idea of preventing this country from being firmly built up halfway were grounded on thorough defeatism with regard to our interests in Asia, he insisted that if there was an attack, a people attacked should first resist it by themselves and then should rely on the promise of the whole civilized world under the UN Charter.*6 Supposing his remarks were intended for south Korea, they can be construed as meaning that he wanted to let the south Korean puppet spark a civil war on the false plea of "north Korea’s attack" and make this alleged vic­tim offer "resistance" to it, and then to realize the all-out US involvement in the Korean war in the name of the "whole civilized world under the UN Char­ter".
It can therefore be said that Acheson’s "defence line" statement reflected a revised US plan for new war provocation, the plan to intervene in the Korean war under the UN appellation and occupy the whole of Korea.
* I. Life, July 15, 1950.
*2. Dean Acheson, Asian Crisis, US Policy’s Trial. (State Dept. Bulletin No. 22, January
23, 1950, p. 116.)
*3. Truman, US Policy for Taiwan. (State Dept. Bulletin No. 22, January 16, 1950, p. 79.)
*4. New York Times, March 2, 1949.
*5. John Gunther, The Riddle of MacArthur, Tokyo, p. 263.
*6. See *2.
Leaving Korea and Taiwan outside the US "defence line," the US rulers asserted that they
had nothing to do with the US "security". That this was a mere smokescreen for covering
up their act of aggression to be committed before long was fully revealed by Acheson
when he. quite oblivious of what he had uttered in January, directly linked up "south
Korea’s security" with US "security". He said right after the outbreak of the Korean war
on June 25, 1950, to this effect: The attack on Korea... is a crucial test as to whether our
collective security system survives or collapses. Meanwhile, the Chiefs of the General
Staffs of the three services came round to the view thatL"cornmunization" of Korea would
spell a threat to Japan (Glenn D. Paige, The United States and the Korean War, Tokyo, p.
183). In his July 27, 1950, statement Truman ordered the occupation of Taiwan, going
back from this January 5 statement on "nonintervention in Taiwan". He thus told a lie first
and then the truth.
The "defence line" statement was therefore no more than a piece of silly trickery.
The second design of the US imperialists to keep its cloven hoof from sight and lay the blame for war on the Republic was to silence the frantic war clamour of the Syngman Rhee clique and get them to spread a rumour that the "north is going to invade the south".
As the special correspondent of the New York Times to Seoul reported, most of the warlike statements had always been made by the south Korean leaders.*! On May 5 Syngman Rhee suggested the impending start of the "march north" by saying: "May and June will mark a very important period in the life of our people."*2 The next day, on May 6, he, again beating the drum of "hot war", made a challenging radio address calling upon the north Koreans to rise up and drive away any "outside force" which was actually nonexistent. Anticipating the conquest of north Korea, he went so far as to appoint even the "governors" for the five provinces of the northern half and set up their "tempo­rary office" in Seoul called "administration office of five provinces in the north". *3 The appointment of the "provincial governors" for five provinces
within the sovereignty of the Republic and the establishment of their "tempo­rary office" showed that the preparation for the "expedition to the north" had been made to the full. On May 10, in the wake of Syngman Rhee’s provocative radio speech, puppet National Defence Minister Sin Song Mo made an "anti-communist" statement that the north Korean army was moving in force toward the 38th parallel and that there was an impending "danger of aggression". *4
But this statement of the puppet National Defence Minister marked the last of the hue and cry for "restoration of the lost territory" and "march north for unification". The war hullabaloo was reduced to dead silence. No provoca­tive statement came from Seoul, either from a press interview or from a "National Assembly" session. No reaction from Tokyo either. Western reporters whose ears had been accustomed to the provocative statements from south Korea, cast grave doubts on this sudden silence and ironically described south Korea in May and June as a "quiet land".
What then did that silence mean? It was the silence before a storm. The ensu­ing developments showed that this ominous silence following the "defence line" statement was no more than a ruse to dull the vigilance of the Korean people and "persuade" the world into believing the possible "surprise attack of the north".
* 1. New York Times, June 26, 1950.
*2. Report on a press interview of AP correspondent King in Seoul, May 5, 1950. (Glenn
D. Paige, The United States and the Korean War, Tokyo, p. 89.)
*3. David W. Conde, An Untold History of Modern Korea, Vol. II, Tokyo, p. 77; Dispatch
of US reporter Andrew Rohs from Seoul.
*4. AP, Seoul, May 10, 1950; New York Times, May 11, 1950.
the US military administration entered a graver stage from 1949. Production was totally destroyed and the currency inflation was uncontrollable. Prices rose sky-high. Compared with 1936, they rose on an average 725 times in 1948, 831 times in April 1949 and 909 times in July of that year.
Economic ruin directly affected the people’s life, roused the broader masses to an anti-US, national salvation struggle, and thus aggravated the political crisis of the Syngman Rhee "government".
The mounting spirit of the people for an independent peaceful reunifica­tion of the country gave birth to the anti-Syngman Rhee forces within the south Korean "National Assembly", including the "group for north-south negotia­tion". An anti-"government" movement started in connection with a vote of "non-confidence in the government", throwing Syngman Rhee’s despotic regime into "confusion".
Such political and economic crisis of south Korea caused great apprehen­sion and unrest among the American rulers who were hurrying with war prepa­rations in the finishing stage. Concerning this, Truman wrote in his Memoirs: "I was deeply concerned over the Rhee government’s lack of concern about the serious inflation that swept the country. Yet we had no other choice but to sup­port Rhee."* l
To clear away the "deep concern" of the US rulers, State Secretary Ache-son sent a memorandum on April 7 to Syngman Rhee, warning him of the need to tide over the political and economic crisis. He wrote to the effect that so long as south Korea failed to check economic inflation and conduct a general election in May, the United States would reexamine its military and economic aid to south Korea and probably feel the need to modify it. *2

Pressing Situation That Brooks No Further Duration

The silence before a storm cannot last long. A ruse to blind the world’s eye and stop the world’s ear has its limit of effect. More, a pressing situation had to be created there where the US imperialists and the Syngman Rhee-led rulers had to hurry over their war provocation. It was occasioned by two caus­es: one was the political and economic crisis of the Syngman Rhee "govern­ment" on the verge of total collapse, and the other was the "imminency" of lib­eration of Taiwan by the Chinese people.
The south Korean economy which had rushed along the road of ruin under
*1. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. II, New York, p. 329.
*2. Leon Gordenker, The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification of Korea, p. 173.
Mindful of the master’s warning, Syngman Rhee urged the "national assemblymen" to work out a well-balanced budget, dismissed 60,000 govern­ment employees and pursued a "retrenchment policy". This policy, however, proved of no avail; it rather worsened the catastrophic economic situation. Par­ticularly, from the year when one million sok of rice was shipped to Japan by Mac Arthur’s "order", prices were boosted to the sky in south Korea. In Seoul the rice supply petered out and two-thirds of its citizens went hungry.
To tide over the political crisis the "election" which would be allegedly
postponed till June or November was conducted on May 30. But its results showed a miserable defeat of Syngman Rhee. Prior to the "election" he had suppressed even the middling forces, to say nothing of the oppositionists, branding them as "Communists". He had committed such a fascist atrocity as jailing 30 opposition candidates. This produced a boomerang effect on the "election". Out of the 210 seats he barely managed to get 47, even raking up all his supporters. Only 12 sided with him in the "National Council for the Promo­tion of Independence".
The convocation of the new National Assembly clearly showed that Syng­man Rhee was meeting his doom. Holding the overwhelming number of seats, the oppositionists strongly demanded the amendment of the Constitution, the curtailment of Presidential authority and the institution of a responsible Cabi­net, thus landing tyrant Syngman Rhee on the precipice of political ruin. He had to take emergency measures immediately.
What could he do in such a situation? The only outlet for him was to ignite a war as soon as possible. As US writer Hershel Meyer wrote, he "hung his last hope of survival on war". Driven to the wall, Syngman Rhee came to the conclusion that war alone could get him out of the precipice and clear away all the political and economic crises.
Thus he hurriedly sent M. Chang to Washington who reported the "ruinous state of the government" to the US master on June 12 and "asked for urgent US aid" to overcome that crisis.*!
As to the "urgent US aid" begged for by Syngman Rhee at the time, the New York Herald Tribune exposed that south Korean ambassador M. Chang had given a warning report to a State Department dignitary on his country being on the brink of collapse and begged for some guarantee for US armed intervention in case of war.*2 In other words, the "urgent aid" asked for by Syngman Rhee from his US master was the demand for an early execution of the war plan.
Having received the urgent message from Syngman Rhee, Truman who had no other way but to back Syngman Rhee, as he had put it himself, now had to check the fall of the Syngman Rhee "government" and, to this end, he had to quickly enkindle a planned war. M. Chang’s report on the ruinous state of the Syngman Rhee "government" thus marked an important occasion for the US government to go into war provocation earlier.
. New York Herald Tribune, June 14, 1950.
*2. New York Herald Tribune, June 26, 1950.
There were also some other factors that made the Truman Administration jump into the Korean war. One factor was the mounting sentiments for peace­ful reunification in Korea.
The Enlarged Meeting of the Central Committee of the Democratic Front for the Reunification of the Fatherland convened on June 7, 1950 on the insis­tence of President Kim II Sung seriously discussed the prevailing situation and adopted an "appeal for promoting measures for the peaceful reunification of the fatherland". The appeal proposed to hold a general election throughout north and south Korea from August 5 to 8, 1950 and establish a united inde­pendent democratic central government by forming a united supreme legisla­tive body. To discuss the question of the establishment of a central guidance committee for this general election, the appeal also proposed to convene a con­sultative meeting of the representatives of north and south Korean political par­ties and social organizations in Haeju or Kaesong between June 15 and 17.
On June 11 three persons left Ryohyon station for Seoul to convey this appeal reflecting the ardent aspiration of the Korean people for national reuni­fication, to all political parties, social organizations, scientific, cultural, educa­tional, press, publishing and religious organs and individuals in south Korea and to the "UN Commission on Korea". But these envoys of peace failed to convey the appeal as they were illegally arrested by the Syngman Rhee clique.
In an effort to evade a civil war and realize the peaceful reunification even under such a situation, President Kim II Sung called a meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly of the DPRK on June 19 and suggested it propose to the "National Assembly" of south Korea that national reunification be achieved by unifying the Supreme People’s Assembly of the DPRK and the "National Assembly" of south Korea into a single legislative body for all Korea.
Nonetheless, the US imperialists and Syngman Rhee who had long planned for "reunification by force" made Chae Pyong Dok and the Director of the Public Information Bureau threaten the south Korean people by issuing a treacherous statement that "north-south negotiations and peaceful reunification were impermissible" and that "anyone attending a meeting of north-south rep­resentatives in response to the proposal of the DFRF...would be branded as a traitor". From June 9 they placed the whole of south Korea up to the 38th par­allel under a "special inspection watch" to hamper the convocation of a joint
meeting of north-south representatives.*! The door of peaceful reunification was thus closed tight due to the war policy followed by a pack of traitors to the nation. *2
*\.AP. Seoul, June 10. 1950. (From Rodong Sinmun on June 13, 1950.) *2. Following the war policy of the US government, the Syngman Rhee "government" was awake only to the "northward march for unification". It had not any other plan for reunification. It cracked down on the slightest move for peaceful reunification, describing it as an "expression of infidelity". In this connection, even the "UN Commission on Korea" made it clear that the Syngman Rhee "government" had not only failed to partici­pate in any official discussion with the north for reunification but even opposed the unof­ficial efforts for it. It could not refrain from reporting that the Rhee "government" had made clear its position of regarding any proposal for north-south discussion, whether unofficial or tentative, as a manifestation of infidelity-. ("UNCK Reports," December 1949-September 1950.)
No obstructive manoeuvres, however, could stem the powerful trend towards peaceful reunification and save the hard-pressed Syngman Rhee "gov­ernment" from collapse. The prevailing situation forced the Washington mas­ters to take urgent measures. The only way to get Syngman Rhee out of the predicament was to quickly carry out their original plan and burn up all the "ominous symptoms" in the flames of war. In his An Untold History of Modern Korea, David W. Conde, who had once served as Chief of the Film Section, the Information and Education Department, the MacArthur Command, drew the following conclusion: ...It would be most reasonable to figure that war was the last resort of crazy Syngman Rhee. As the last game the Syngman Rhee "government" drove the country into a civil war, unable to keep itself steady in face of economic destruction, domestic unrest, harassment by the hostile National Assembly since his defeat in May, and then the people’s leanings towards the peace statement of the north.*i This view of Conde’s may be said to have rather concentrically explained why the US imperialists and the Syng­man Rhee clique had rushed at war.
Another important factor that made the US hurriedly ignite the Korean war was the supposed information that the Chinese people were going to liber­ate Taiwan in the summer.
According to the confession made by Mun Hak Bong, the former political advisor to Syngman Rhee, the US government, having received information that
the Chinese people would launch an operation for the liberation of Taiwan in July at the latest, decided to get on with it and advanced the date of the provocation of the Korean war to June. (That information was of doubtful accuracy. It might have been based on assumption or fabricated.) Mun Hak Bong’s testimony that they had turned to the supposed information about the move for the liberation of Taiwan was substantiated by the then US press reports. The New York Times reported that around the mid-June of 1950 the Chinese People’s Liberation Army had wound up all preparations for an "invasion of Taiwan" with its Third Field Army as a mainstay. In his The United States and the Korean War Glenn D. Paige quoted the information obtained by the US Information Bureau by the late spring of 1950 as saying that the Chinese Communist Party had been contemplat­ing the invasion of Taiwan which would be started some day in summer.*2 In mid-June, with the outbreak of the Korean war near at hand, American newspa­pers let out the secret of their government all at once by reporting that the Depart­ment of Defence was going to strongly demand in the third week of June 1950 the President to repeal his resolution on Taiwan (His nonintervention policy for Tai­wan made public on January 5-Qitoter)*3
What did this report of the US newspapers suggest? It only signified first­ly that both the "defence line" statement and the statement on the "noninter­vention policy for Taiwan" issued by the US rulers in January had been a sheer lie and proceeded virtually from a ruse to invent a pretext for occupying Korea and Taiwan which were allegedly outside the "defence line", and secondly that the US rulers had interlinked the Korean and Taiwan questions from the start and put rather greater weight on them than Japan, Loochoos and the Philip­pines within the "defence line". In those days no one had ever issued a state­ment about "liberating" Japan, Loochoos and the Philippines; there had not been and could not be the slightest sign of it. In other words, these regions within the "defence line" had been too much "secure" for the United States to issue a threatening statement about their "protection from invasion". Now it is clear that the main object of the "defence line" statement was to ensure the "security" of Taiwan and south Korea, not that of the regions within the "defence line" and, on that pretext, to fabricate "invasion" from the Chinese mainland and north Korea and then completely occupy Taiwan and the whole of Korea by force of arms. Indicative of this is Truman’s notorious June 27 statement in which he officially proclaimed the armed intervention of the US naval and air forces in the Korean war and ordered the Seventh Fleet to Taiwan to occupy it.

All this provides ample grounds for saying that when the US rulers obtained the information about the "plan for Taiwan’s liberation" they did not confirm its accuracy but schemed to provoke the Korean war before the Chi­nese people could go into an operation for the liberation of Taiwan.
* 1. David W. Conde, An Untold History of Modern Korea, Vol. II, Tokyo, p. 104. *2. Glenn D. Paige, The United Slates and the Korean War, Tokyo, p. 80.
*3. Washington Post, June 22, 1950. New York Herald Tribune, June 24, 1950.
As can be seen from the above, the worst political and economic crisis of the Syngman Rhee "government" in June plus the "plan for Taiwan’s libera­tion" in June or July put the US in an awkward position where they could no longer delay the provocation of war in Korea for the sake of their two puppets in Asia. They decided to get out of that position and tide over the two crises at the same time. They thought it was the best policy to ignite a Korean war with­in June to secure the bridgehead for aggression on the continent. When Dulles was leaving for Korea to "inspect" it right before June 25 on an important mis­sion for the provocation of a Korean war, M. Chang implored for US armed intervention in Korea. He also pleaded: "We want to see that Taiwan will be protected by the United States because of its invaluable strategic location."* That threw another light on the plan of the war provokers.
*  "M. Chang’s Message to Syngman Rhee. June 14, 1950." (Documentary Evidences for the Provocation of a Korean Civil War by the US Imperialists,  p. 83.)
Four-Bigwigs Talk in Tokyo and Dulles* Tour of South Korea
Everything in Washington, Tokyo and Seoul went according to the plan for a Korean war worked out by the US imperialists.
The urgent message on the "ruinous crisis of the Syngman Rhee govern­ment", the begging for "armed intervention" and the alleged "Taiwan crisis" did not allow the Truman Administration to put off a Korean war later than June. They went into action at once. A tense atmosphere hung over Washing­ton. Two days after Truman received M. Chang’s report, he decided to rush the military and administrative big shots to Tokyo and Seoul, who would act for him and inform him of the start of the "northward march" after ultimately mak-
ing sure of the preparations for war provocation on the 38th parallel. They were Secretary of Defence Johnson, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Bradley and Presidential envoy Dulles who would leave Washington for Tokyo respectively on the pretext of discussing a "peace treaty with Japan" and go into an "accidental" huddle at the Mac-Arthur Command. This was how the "Tokyo four-man talk" was arranged.
Now what was the mission of these four bigwigs and what did they dis­cuss at the Tokyo talk? The important phase of it was disclosed by US corre­spondents in Tokyo who had often caused trouble at the time by divulging the secrets of the MacArthur Command. The New York Times wrote that the con­fidential nature of the talk showed they were discussing rather a very important problem than such everyday affairs as the conditions of barracks and the progress of training.*! An AP report from Tokyo said that the loss of Taiwan would gravely threaten the US defence line in the Far East.*2 The New York Times dated June 20 reported bluntly that General MacArthur, too, seemed to fully share the view on the impossibility of setting the Japanese question apart (from the Korean and Taiwan questions-Quote r). ••• It added that accordingly, they must have discussed the Korean or Taiwan question.*3 Meanwhile, John­son, back to Washington from Tokyo, said in his June 24 statement that he had inspected every important unit in the Far East and grasped the real state of affairs.*4 The above news reports and Johnson’s statement indicate that the main subject of the Tokyo talk was not the question of a "peace treaty with Japan" as alleged by Truman but the military affairs concerning the provoca­tion of the Korean war.
That talk was held for five days after M. Chang had informed the US imperi­alists of the "ruinous state of the Syngman Rhee government’1 and asked them for an immediate armed intervention. There the four big shots discussed the Korean and Taiwan questions in caucus. They had to inspect the US army units in Japan. All this suggests that they must have come to a definite decision on all military, political and diplomatic questions necessary for the all-out armed intervention of the US troops in the Korean war to be ignited by Syngman Rhee on their instruc­tion, and that MacArthur and Syngman Rhee must have received a certain direc­tive respectively for the start of war including the reinforcement of the Far Eastern troops. That was why the New York Herald Tribune and New York Post exposed that the four big shots had admitted the "absolute necessity of a new positive poli­cy" and immediately ordered a detail of US special bombers, including the "newest and largest types", to the Far East.*5
*1. New York Times, June 21. 1950. *2.AP, Tokyo, June 19, 1950. *3. New York Times, June 20. 1950. *4. Washington Post, June 25, 1950. *5. New York Post, June 28, 1950.
The four bigwigs’ mission and their criminal plot hatched at the Tokyo talk were revealed in an ever more glaring light by the south Korean tour of John Foster Dulles, a notorious "hot war maniac" and "warmonger".
Dulles flew into south Korea after receiving the information about the "ruinous state of the Syngman Rhee government" and the "request for an urgent aid".*I According to M. Chang’s report to Syngman Rhee, Dulles came to south Korea with "a big say in preparing and deciding the Far East­ern policy of the US State Department".*2 The motive of his visit to south Korea and the mighty power conferred upon him are enough to show the
aim of that visit.
In view of the testimonies given by Kim Hyo Sok, the former Interior Minister of the Syngman Rhee "government", and Mun Hak Bong, the then advisor to the "CIC", it can be said that the mission of Dulles was to exam­ine the war preparations of Syngman Rhee, give him a specific directive concerning the provocation of the civil war, outline the course of action after the outbreak of war, and thus bring about a "decisive turn" in the Far Eastern policy of the United States.
David W. Conde offered a detailed comment on the meaning of the "decisive turn in the Far Eastern policy of the United States", about which M. Chang had said. He wrote to this effect: In view of the then situation pre­vailing in Korea and China, the only likely "decisive turn" must have meant that the US policy would deliver Chiang Kai-shek instead of admitting the victory of the Chinese revolution and would give Syngman Rhee supremacy over the whole of Korea. This "decisive turn" implied the large-scale posi­tive intervention of the US troops.*3
*1. New York Herald Tribune, June 26, 1950.
*2. "M. Chang’s Message to Syngman Rhee, June 14, 1950" {Documentary Evidences for
the Provocation of a Korean Civil War by the US Imperialists, p. 82.)
*3. David W. Conde, An Untold History of Modern Korea, Vol. II, Tokyo, p. 95.
On arriving in Seoul, Dulles started bustling about to fulfil his mission. Taking puppet National Defence Minister Sin Song Mo and others along, he first went to the 38th parallel for "inspection". After looking out over the defences of the northern half and inspecting the deployment of the south Kore­an puppet troops on the 38th parallel (In his "souvenir picture" taken on the spot at the time, Dulles assumes the posture of signalling the attack on the north, with an operation map spread before him), Dulles said before the "ROK" army men as follows: "No strong enemy whatever would stand against you. But I hope you will strive ever harder because the day is not so far off when you’ll have to display your great might for your own sake."*i
That was June 18, a week before the outbreak of the Korean war. But at that time many people were not clear about how and when the "ROK" army, praised as the "first-rate army in Asia", would "display its might". More, they never thought the "northward march", hinted by him would start only a week after his harangue.
On the 19th, Dulles, speaking for the first time to the south Korean "National Assembly" in whose election Syngman Rhee had been a loser, blus­tered: "The eyes of the free world are upon you." Expressing the readiness of the United States to "give the moral and material support" to south Korea which was fighting against communism, he concluded his speech with the fol­lowing words: "You are not alone. You will never be alone so long as you con­tinue to play worthily your part in the great design for the freedom of human beings."*2 Syngman Rhee for his part pledged before Dulles at the "National Assembly": "We will win back the free world with a hot war if we lose the cold war because of our laziness. And we will fight till the Communists per­ish.. .."*3
Dulles’ speech at the south Korean "National Assembly" was "a statement confirming the official stand of the US policy toward south Korea".*4 It was said that Dulles’ speech had been examined in advance by Rusk, Assistant Sec­retary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, and especially the last words had been carefully written by the officials of the State Department. This means that through Dulles’ mouth the US government egged on the south Korean puppets to a conflict with communism and officially hinted to them an all-out support to be given by the United States to south Korea even without an official com­mitment when Syngman Rhee would ignite a civil war. A carefully worded expression of it was Dulles’ words of encouragement to the south Korean pup­pets, that they would never be alone so long as they continued to play worthily
their part in the US design for the "freedom of human beings".
The data released later show that Dulles met Syngman Rhee and Sin Song Mo at the US embassy housed in the Pando Hotel, Seoul, and re-examined the "northward expedition plan" behind closed doors. He instructed them to "attack north Korea along with the counter-propaganda that north Korea had invaded south Korea first" as planned and hold out for two weeks at any cost. He reaffirmed: "If you will hold out only for two weeks, the United States will complain that north Korea attacked south Korea, and see to it that the United Nations can mobilize ground, naval and air forces under its name."*5 Then Dulles animated the stooges with the words that if a war would go as planned "the communists would eventually lose their domination over north Korea".*6
Such was the ulterior object of Dulles’ tour of south Korea made from the 17th to the 20th on a "special mission" as said by Glenn D. Paige.
*]. "Kim Hyo  Sok’s Testimony. September 26, 1950." (Documentary Evidences for the Provocation of a Korean Civil War by the US Imperialists, p. 127.) *2. "Proceedings of the South Korean National Assembly" (Translated from the docu­ments of the US embassy). Glenn D. Paige, The United States and the Korean War, Tokyo, p. 82.
*3. "Proceedings of the South Korean National Assembly" (From the documents of the US embassy).
*4. Glenn D. Paige, The United Stales and the Korean War, Tokyo, p. 82. *5. "Kim Hyo Sok’s Testimony, September 26, 1950." (Documentary Evidences for the Provocation of a Korean Civil War by the US Imperialists, p. 128.) Famous Australian writer Burchett wrote: "There can be no reasonable doubt that the visit of Dulles was to give the signal for the attack to be launched and to assure Syngman Rhee on the highest level that the moment the attack started, American air and naval support would be forthcoming." (This Monstrous War, p. 114.)
*6. AP, June 19, 1950, Seoul. The New York Times dated June 20, 1950 carried Dulles’ warning words at the "National Assembly": "Compromise with communism would be to take the road leading to disaster." Evidently this was an urge to turn down the June pro­posal of the Republic for independent peaceful reunification and a signal for starting the "march north".
While Dulles was busy urging the south Korean puppet army and police to a "northward march" and giving Syngman Rhee detailed war instructions, a grand military parade of the US 8th Army was held, reviewed by Johnson,

Dulles making final examination of the plan of invasion of the northerbn
half of the Republic in a trench along the 38th parallel(June 18, 1950)

Bradely and MacArthur, in the square in front of the Imperial Palace in Tokyo. (Asahi Shimbun dated June 20, 1950.) This represented a challenge to and mil­itary pressure on the Korean people in their efforts for peaceful reunification and a provocative act aimed at implying what "positive action" would be like.
The aim of Dulles’ visit to Seoul and his mission were exposed to the full in his farewell messages to Syngman Rhee and "Foreign Minister" Rim Pyong Jik. On June 20 he wrote to Syngman Rhee: "/ attach great importance to the decisive role which your country can play in the great drama that is unfold­ing." *\ To Rim Pyong Jik he expressed the “hope for mutual help between the two countries" and concluded the letter with the meaningful words: "Above all, I appreciated the opportunity of discussing with you and with President Rhee some of the hard problems that we face, problems that will require courageous and bold decisions. " *2
Back in Tokyo, Dulles immediately went into a huddle with MacArthur, Johnson and Bradley. On the basis of his report on the real state of affairs in south Korea, they fixed the date for the start of war*3 and finally confirmed the role to be played by the puppet Syngman Rhee troops in the provocation of war and the action programme of the US ground, naval and air forces in the Far East. Then they declared to the world: "The United States will soon take some positive action."*4
At the time the world people were not clear on Dulles’ impending "great drama", on their "hard problems requiring courageous and bold decisions" and on the forthcoming "positive action" of the United States. Their true meaning could be understood only by a few who would play the "decisive role" in that "drama" and those who would organize that "positive action requiring coura­geous and bold decisions".
Only several days later could the world public find a clue to all of those mysterious words. As laid bare by US correspondent Stone, it was the "out­break of the Korean war on June 25 and the June 27 commitment of the US government to large-scale intervention against communism in the Pacific area."*5
*1. Who Began the Korean War? edited by the Committee for A. Democratic Far Eastern
Policy, Tokyo, p. 41.
*2. "John Foster Dulles’ Letter to Rim Pyong Jik, June 20, 1950". (Documentary Evi­dences for the Provocation of a Korean Civil War by the US Imperialists, p. 88.) *3. It was said that Chief of the "AMAG" in Korea had explained to Syngman Rhee why
June 25 had been fixed as the date of war as follows:"We have chosen the 25th and this explains our prudence. It is Sunday. It’s the Sabbath for both the United States and south Korea, Christian states. No one will believe we have started a war on Sunday. In short, it is to make people believe that we are not the first to open a war." June 25 was the last Sunday of that month. There was no alternative for them but to choose that day for a Sun­day. It was June 12 that they had received Syngman Rhee’s request for urgent aid. On the 14th they sent Dulles to south Korea. He left south Korea on the 21st. Johnson and Bradley left Japan on the 23rd. So the 25th was only Sunday left in June. *4. After a talk Dulles said to the reporters that "the United States predicted its ‘positive action’ to preserve peace in the Far East." (New York Times, June 22, 1950.) *5.1.F. Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War, Vol. I, Tokyo, p. 37.

The 38th Parallel on the Eve of June 25

The situation at the 38th parallel grew tenser all of a sudden from the day the war plotters were back after the Tokyo talk.
But it had remained tense since January 1950 when the revised plan for the provocation of a new war had been ratified. Under this plan the puppet army underwent a great change in its disposition in the whole front area south of the 38th parallel, and a huge armed force was getting ready for attack on the northern half.
The Second and Fifth Divisions of the "ROK army" which had been spread out in Taegu, Taejon, Kwangju and other areas to "mop up" the guerril­las under the "rear security plan" were moved in the direction of Kaesong, Seoul and Uijongbu and, together with the "Metropolitan Division", were deployed as the operational reserves of the Eighth, Sixth, Seventh, and First Divisions and the Seventeenth Regiment in the forward area. At the end of April 1950 the two "combat headquarters" were formed to command the five divisions deployed in the first echelon along the 38th parallel, and Chae Pyong Dok, Chief of the General Staff of the puppet army, and Kim Sok Won were appointed as their commanders respectively, one on the eastern front and the other on the western front.*l And the artillery and other units of technical ser­vices which had been under the direct control of the Army were transferred to the divisions in the first echelon, and all military supplies and equipment were concentrated on Seoul and Uijongbu.
As testified by MacArthur at the joint hearings of both Houses in April
1951, the "ROK army" had "concentrated all its supplies and equipment on the area along the 38th parallel", its units had made offensive dispositions, not "defensive ones in depth," and thus the whole region between the "38th paral­lel and Seoul" had been turned into a "logistical area".*2
*1. "Mun Hak Bong’s Radio Address, July 21, 1950." (Documentary Evidences for the Provocation of a Korean Civil War by the US Imperialists, p. 104.)
*2. Mac Arthur Hearings, pp. 230-31. As early as May 19, a month before the outbreak of the war, Johnson, Chief of the ECA in Korea, said before the US House Appropriations Committee that "100,000 men and officers of the ROK army armed with US weapons and trained by Americans have wound up preparations for entering a war at any moment." (The United States Defeated, Tokyo, p. 17.) Johnson’s speech, along with Mac Arthur’s testimony, bespoke that the US imperialists had already wound up war preparations long before June 25 and had been ready to go into the "northward march" at any moment upon orders. Thus it exploded the spurious propaganda spread by those on their payroll that the "ROK army" had been in a defensive posture on the eve of June 25 and that it had failed to make any war preparations.
Willoughby, director of the Information Department of the MacArthur’s Headquarters, confessed that when a war was impending...most of the Syng-man Rhee troops had already virtually been deployed along the 38th parallel.*
*WiIloughby, MacArthur 1941-195!, p. 354.
The deployment of the 100,000 -strong force of the south Korean puppet army along the 38th parallel in an offensive posture meant that an aggression could be launched at any moment by the war incendiaries and that the situation had reached the brink of war.
In such a tense situation at the 38th parallel the People’s Army, the revo­lutionary armed forces of the Republic, had to strengthen its stand of defence and keep itself in full combat readiness to rout the aggressors at one stroke.
President Kim II Sung taught as follows:
"After receiving in early May 1950 the reliable information about the preparations for attack on the north, the Government of the Democratic Peo­ple’s Republic of Korea could take timely measures for repelling aggression."
Having gained a scientific insight into the tense situation created due to the aggressive machinations of the US imperialists, President Kim II Sung gave
orders to make full preparations for crushing the enemy’s surprise attack.
Following the President’s teaching, the Korean People’s Army and Secu­rity Forces strove hard to increase their combat capacities, replenishing their ranks and strengthening their combat and political training. At the same time, they took measures from May to accommodate themselves to a state of emer­gency, keeping the strictest watch on the suspicious movements of the enemy. But it was in every sense the strengthening of a defensive stand aimed to smash the enemy’s invasion. That was why Roberts, the former head of the "AMAG", had to admit before reporters on May 28: "At present there is no sign of the reinforcements of the north Korean army along the 38th parallel."*!
The war provokers considered this "no sign of the reinforcements" of the People’s Army along the 38th parallel to be the "golden opportunity" for their action. Dulles, back to Tokyo after inspecting the 38th parallel, must have reported this state of affairs and advised that it would be the best policy to send the signal flare for the northward march on June 25 as planned.
Against such a background of movements, the 38th parallel was in a touch-and-go situation on the eve of June 25. According to Burchett, progres­sive Australian writer, "American staff officers were sitting on the parallel, American reconnaissance planes were constantly flying over the area along the 38th parallel, patrols were always probing across the 38th parallel, and a high­ly-organized espionage network was active behind that line".*2
According to the testimony of Han Su Hwan, the former operation officer and political instructor of the Seventeenth Regiment of the puppet army, who hung out a white flag, the former "northward expedition plan" or an ABC oper­ational plan which would have been decided at a divisional commanders’ meeting in May and put into effect by orders of a battalion commander was cancelled, and there came down instead a new plan named the "stratagem of the general headquarters" for the whole "ROK army" to engage exclusively in training for an offensive warfare.
With June 25 drawing nearer, the officers of the "ROK army" headquarters "visited the front line in greater frequency", and Mez Stragy and seven other US military advisors were out to build up a war system, controlling the Seventeenth Regiment. To stiffen the morale of the puppet armymen, they extolled the "ROK army" equipped with the newest weapons as a "world’s first-rate army". They even blustered: "You must not only capture north Korea and regain the lost terri­tory but occupy Manchuria, once a part of your territory."
According to the testimony of Han Su Hwan, ever since June 23 when the
UN military supervisor left Seoul after inspecting the Seventeenth Regiment (participants in the Tokyo four-man talk also left for Washington that day), the "situation of the front line had grown so acute" that all men could sense "some unusual things would happen". The 24th was Saturday, but all the men includ­ing the officers were confined to the barracks and ordered to keep themselves on a stand-by alert.*3
According to the report of the Home Ministry of the Republic, from 22:00 on June 23 the puppet army units at the 38th parallel which had been in a "state of emergency" went into a large-scale artillery bombardment over the area north of the 38th parallel. By the 24th they had fired more than 700 of 105-mm howitzer and 81-mm mortar shells. This bombardment launched in the wake of the Tokyo talk was the preliminary firing signalling the start of an all-out armed aggression of the US imperialists and the prelude to their "great drama" and "positive action".
*1. Roberts’ words on May 28, 1950 were recorded by AP   reporter King. (Glenn D.
Paige, The United Stales and the Korean War, Tokyo, p. 89.)
*2. Wilfred Burchett, This Monstrous War, p. 121.
*3. "Han Su Hwan’s Testimony, June 29, 1950." (The Documentary Evidences for the
Provocation of a Korean Civil War by the US Imperialists, pp. 90-93.)
On June 21, 1950 Jang To Yong, Director of the Information Department of the puppet army, sent spies into the northern half, while instructing Pack Son Yop, First Divisional Commander, and Yun Jung Gun, Commander of the Ninth Regiment in Pochon, to keep a peak state of vigilance. On June 23 the field intelligence unit of the puppet army infiltrated its agents into Tosong-ri and Ryangmun-ri in the forward area to spy out the mood of the people and, on June 24, Kim Pyong Ri, chief of the head office of the intelligence unit of the puppet army, crept into Tosong-ri himself. But they reported that they were "all unable to collect any data foreshadowing the June 25 event".*!
It is believed that the "northward expedition plan" by "orders of a battal­ion commander", exposed by Han Su Hwan, meant a war plan for 1949 or a plan for intrusion on the 38th parallel, while the new "stratagem of the general headquarters" signifying a new war provocation plan for 1950 revised with an all-out armed intervention of the US troops as its backbone.
The US imperialists and their stooges did not forget to exhibit a show of veiling their aggressive nature by the very time they enkindled the war. For one
thing, they spread a false rumour that on the night of the 24th a banquet was arranged on the occasion of the opening of the officers’ club of the Army Headquarters, where the "commanders from the foremost area and most of the brass hats of the Defence Ministry and Army Headquarters amused themselves late into the night". They also insisted that the "state of emergency" was lifted on the 24th and there was only one-third of the armed force in the barracks as all officers and men were granted furlough or outings. This was a thinly-veiled trick to "justify" their argument for the "armed attack of the north Korean troops", shift the blame for the provocation of war on the Republic and invent pretexts for their defeat in the war.
As disclosed by Willoughby, all the south Korean troops were given warning and deployed along the 38th parallel from a few weeks before the start of war.*2 And how could it be possible for them to leave the foremost area undefended when they allegedly knew about an "imminent attack of north Korea"? More, it is hardly imaginable in a military sense that they should have granted furlough or outings to two-thirds of the officers and men of their front line units. It is also strange that the "state of emergency" was lifted on the 38th parallel the very day after Dulles had proclaimed the start of "positive action". The pure falsity of their arguments is plainly visible from the humourous recol­lections of Ri Song Ga, the former Commander of the Eighth Division of the "ROK army" deployed on the eastern front. Concerning the dinner party arranged on the occasion of the opening of the officers’ club of the puppet Army Headquarters he said:"For the units in Seoul, it seemed another matter, but for me, a front line divisional commander, it was different. We had been in a state of emergency at that time. There had been a curfew order, and we had to go into battle from the dawn t>/June 25 ". *3
*1. Collection of Army War History, Vol. I, Hara Bookshop, 1975, Tokyo, p. 26.
*2. Cosmopolitan, No. 12, 1951.
*3. The Tragedy of the Korean War, Sasanggye, No. 6, 1965, Seoul.
As seen above, one who would ignite a war and the time of ignition were decided and preliminary fire opened under the baton of the US to break the calmness on the eve of the storm in the "quiet land of May and June". All that they had to do now was to get the ground units to launch an all-out offensive on orders of the MacArthur Command and the "AMAG". A war would presently break out on the 38th parallel under the criminal plot to plunge the
Korean people into a scourge of war, and the world public into the holocaust of another world war.

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