How the Korean War started 'Situation of the Eve of June 25 ' from the Modern History of Korea'

Situation on the Eve of June 25 



The warlords in Washington were much flurried by the urgent 
report of the "Seoul crisis" and the positive proposal of the DPRK for 
peaceful reunification. They had sought their outlet in war and now 
considered it couldn't be put off any longer. 

The longer the start of war was deferred, the more it would be 
unfavourable to them. The Syngman Rhee puppet regime, forsaken by 
the people and even by the "National Assembly," would fall in no time. 
And it was clear that US imperialism would become ever more 
awkward when there was a daily mounting trend towards peaceful 
reunification. 

But it was Syngman Rhee who was driven beyond all limits. His 
fate hanging in the balance now, he had no thought but to ignite war 
quickly, which would help him to arrest the advance of his opponents 
and keep his post. 

There was another factor that made US imperialism and traitor 
Syngman Rhee dash for a war with greater fury. It was the so-called 
"Taiwan crisis." 

The US government, which had obtained the information that 


The Chinese Communist Party had been contemplating the invasion 
of Taiwan to be started some day in summer,"* 1 received a more 
detailed information that the Chinese People's Liberation Army had 
wound up its operational preparations for Taiwan liberation.* 2 

11 Glenn D. Paige, The United States and the Korean War, Japanese ed 
Tokyo, p. 80. . 

* 2 According to the confession made by Mun Hak Bong, the former political 
advisor to Syngman Rhee, the US government, having received an information 
thai the Chinese people would launch operations for the liberation of Taiwan in 
July at latest, decided to advance the date of the provocation of the Korean war to 
June and schemed to solve the Taiwan question with this war. (Exposure of the 
Truth about the US Imperialist Policy of Aggression against Korea and the Real 
Provoker of the Civil War, Pyongyang, pp. 72-80.) 

These informations, though doubtful of their accuracy, could not 
but give a big impact on US imperialism in sparking war in Korea. 
Basing itself on these "informations" US imperialism decided to hurry 
up the provocation of the Korean war. 

To implement this decision on the spot, on the order of Truman, 
Defence Secretary Johnson, .Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Bradley and State Department Advisor Dulles who also acted as 
Presidential envoy flew to Tokyo and had a secret talk together with 
MacArthur. 

At this so-called "Tokyo four-men talk" they discussed the 
Korean affairs" and the "Taiwan affairs" in camera, not the question 
of a peace treaty with Japan" as alleged in their official statement. 
They shared the same view on the "absolute necessity of a new positive 
policy" (the provocation of a war— Quoter).*" Johnson and Bradley 
received fvlacArthur's report on the state of the US ground, air and 
naval forces in the Far East and inspected them on the spot'* 2 

• The New York Times, June 20, 1 950 and Ne w York Post, June 28, 1 950. 

" 2 Back to Washington, Johnson said in his June 24 statement that they had 
inspected every important unit in the Far East and grasped the real state of affairs 
(Washington Post, June 25, 1950.) 

On June 1 7 notorious war maniac Dulles crept into south Korea. 
His mission was to examine the war preparation of Syngman Rhee and 
give him a directive concerning the provocation of the civil war after 
smelling out the defences of north Korea. He first went to the 38th 
parallel for inspection on June 1 8. After looking out over the defences 
of the northern half and inspecting the war preparation of the south 
Korean puppet army, he inspired the puppet army officers and men to 
war with this word: "No strong enemy whatever would stand against you But I hope you will strive ever harder because the day is not so tar 
off when you'll have to display your great might for your own sake.' 

" Documentary Evidences for the Provocation of Korean Civil War by the US 
Imperialists, p. 1 27. 

On June 19 Dulles, attending the opening session of the new 
south Korean "National Assembly." told about the US Far Eastern 
policy and hinting "northward expedition," said that "you are not 
alone" in the fight with the communists and that they would always 
receive strong "moral and materia! support" from the United States.* 

* Glenn D.Paige, The United States and the Korean War, Japanese ed., 
Tokyo, pp. 82 and 91 . 

Much satisfied with his successful Seoul trip, Dulles left south 
Korea leaving two farewell messages to Syngman Rhee and puppet 
Foreign Minister Rim Byong Jik. In the message to Syngman Rhee, he 
wrote: "I attach great importance to the decisive role which your 
country can play in the great drama that is unfolding." 1 To Rim Byong 
Jik he wrote: "...I appreciated the opportunity of discussing with you 
and with President Rhee some of the hard problems that we face, 
problems that will require courageous and bold decision."* 2 Back to 
Tokyo he met his colleagues, reported the result of his south Korean 
visit and finally confirmed every detail of their war plan. 

"i Who Began the Korean War?, Japanese ed., Tokyo, p. 41. 

John Foster Dulles' letter to Rim Byong Jik, June 20, 1950. 
(Documentary Evidences for the Provocation of Korean Civil War by the US 
imperialists, pp. 88-89.) 

The Syngman Rhee clique pushed forward the war preparations in 
the last stage with the backing of the US imperialist overlords. 

They started readjusting the deployment of the puppet army along 
the 38th parallel from early 1950. Now they completed it and got 
themselves fully ready for a "jump on the north" at a stroke.* 

- MacArthur who had hand in this work testified: "The south Korean army 
had concentrated all its supplies and equipment on the area along the 38th 
parallel Its units hadn't made dispositions in depth (defenses - Quoter). and thus 
The whole region between the 38th parallel and Seoul had been turned into a 
logistical areof the Korean Wat 
south Korean magazine SaSanggye.- Ho. 6, 1,965.)