Provocation of the Korean War by US Imperialism
Silence before the Storm
"Let’s
start war in Korea"-this was an unalterable policy of the US
government. In accordance with this predetermined policy the war plan
was given a definite shape in top secrecy and, entering 1950, the war
preparations proceeded at the finishing stage.
As John Osborn, Life
correspondent to south Korea, wrote that "never before in our history
had we been so nearly prepared at the start of any war as we were at the
start of this war",*l the United States had never displayed so great
trickery and prepared arms so fully as in the Korean war in its history
of overseas aggression marked by swindling and fraud, threats and
blackmail.
Everything went according to their plan. But they deemed
it necessary to make assurance doubly sure, and thought it was important
above all to invent some plausible pretexts before kindling war.
With
this in view, they formed some designs to veil their aggressive nature
and lay the blame for war at the Republic’s door. The first design was
to "convince" the world of the fact that Korea’s "security" had nothing
to do with US security and that the US was not interested in Korea.
Hence
the US rulers started booming that Korea was of no strategic value in
the Far Eastern policy of the United States. A typical instance of it
was provided by US State Secretary Acheson who declared on January 12,
1950 at the Federal Club that the US defence line in the Far East ran
from the Aleutians to the Loochoos through Japan proper and then from
the Loochoos to the Philippines, thus deliberately setting south Korea
aside. And he evidently hinted at south Korea and Taiwan when he said
that as for the security of the countries outside this defence line no
one could guarantee them against military attack. In this way he tried
to give an impression that it was not the US policy to "defend" south
Korea. *2 Then Connally, Chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, made a statement to the effect that Korea was not on the
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"foremost
defence line" of the United States. Meanwhile, Truman, in his policy
statement on January 5, said that the US government was not inclined to
follow the line of meddling in the civil war of China. He even declared
for the so-called "policy of nonintervention in Taiwan", that is, a
policy of not giving any military aid or advice to the Chiang Kai-shek
troops of Taiwan.*3 The American rulers also stressed, time and again,
that the United States would refrain from officially participating in
any regional military alliance in Asia including the Pacific Treaty
Organization.
At that time no small number of the world public were
dazed by a string of such statements let out by the US rulers from the
outset of 1950. Some even nearly believed the United States would really
take its hands off south Korea and Taiwan. But many others still
greatly doubted those statements issued at the time when they were
loud-mouthed about the "crisis of Asia" and the "threat of southward
invasion". They tried to take a look into the shady side of that
"defence line" statement.
A gimlet in a bag shows itself. The
hypocritic nature of those statements soon came into the open. They were
an anaesthetic to benumb the vigilance of the world public, the Korean
and Chinese peoples in particular, over the US war policy and a
smokescreen to cover up their war provocation plan. One year before,
MacArthur announced that "today the Pacific Ocean... is a lake of the
Anglo-Saxons"*4 and even made a secret promise, saying: "I will defend
south Korea as I would defend the shores of my own native land."*5
Acheson himself could not conceal his real intention in the latter part
of the above-said speech. Stressing that the claim for giving up aid to
south Korea and the idea of preventing this country from being firmly
built up halfway were grounded on thorough defeatism with regard to our
interests in Asia, he insisted that if there was an attack, a people
attacked should first resist it by themselves and then should rely on
the promise of the whole civilized world under the UN Charter.*6
Supposing his remarks were intended for south Korea, they can be
construed as meaning that he wanted to let the south Korean puppet spark
a civil war on the false plea of "north Korea’s attack" and make this
alleged victim offer "resistance" to it, and then to realize the
all-out US involvement in the Korean war in the name of the "whole
civilized world under the UN Charter".
It can therefore be said that
Acheson’s "defence line" statement reflected a revised US plan for new
war provocation, the plan to intervene in the Korean war under the UN
appellation and occupy the whole of Korea.
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* I. Life, July 15, 1950.
*2. Dean Acheson, Asian Crisis, US Policy’s Trial. (State Dept. Bulletin No. 22, January
23, 1950, p. 116.)
*3. Truman, US Policy for Taiwan. (State Dept. Bulletin No. 22, January 16, 1950, p. 79.)
*4. New York Times, March 2, 1949.
*5. John Gunther, The Riddle of MacArthur, Tokyo, p. 263.
*6. See *2.
Leaving Korea and Taiwan outside the US "defence line," the US rulers asserted that they
had nothing to do with the US "security". That this was a mere smokescreen for covering
up their act of aggression to be committed before long was fully revealed by Acheson
when he. quite oblivious of what he had uttered in January, directly linked up "south
Korea’s security" with US "security". He said right after the outbreak of the Korean war
on June 25, 1950, to this effect: The attack on Korea... is a crucial test as to whether our
collective security system survives or collapses. Meanwhile, the Chiefs of the General
Staffs of the three services came round to the view thatL"cornmunization" of Korea would
spell a threat to Japan (Glenn D. Paige, The United States and the Korean War, Tokyo, p.
183). In his July 27, 1950, statement Truman ordered the occupation of Taiwan, going
back from this January 5 statement on "nonintervention in Taiwan". He thus told a lie first
and then the truth.
The "defence line" statement was therefore no more than a piece of silly trickery.
The
second design of the US imperialists to keep its cloven hoof from sight
and lay the blame for war on the Republic was to silence the frantic
war clamour of the Syngman Rhee clique and get them to spread a rumour
that the "north is going to invade the south".
As the special
correspondent of the New York Times to Seoul reported, most of the
warlike statements had always been made by the south Korean leaders.*!
On May 5 Syngman Rhee suggested the impending start of the "march north"
by saying: "May and June will mark a very important period in the life
of our people."*2 The next day, on May 6, he, again beating the drum of
"hot war", made a challenging radio address calling upon the north
Koreans to rise up and drive away any "outside force" which was actually
nonexistent. Anticipating the conquest of north Korea, he went so far
as to appoint even the "governors" for the five provinces of the
northern half and set up their "temporary office" in Seoul called
"administration office of five provinces in the north". *3 The
appointment of the "provincial governors" for five provinces
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within
the sovereignty of the Republic and the establishment of their
"temporary office" showed that the preparation for the "expedition to
the north" had been made to the full. On May 10, in the wake of Syngman
Rhee’s provocative radio speech, puppet National Defence Minister Sin
Song Mo made an "anti-communist" statement that the north Korean army
was moving in force toward the 38th parallel and that there was an
impending "danger of aggression". *4
But this statement of the puppet
National Defence Minister marked the last of the hue and cry for
"restoration of the lost territory" and "march north for unification".
The war hullabaloo was reduced to dead silence. No provocative
statement came from Seoul, either from a press interview or from a
"National Assembly" session. No reaction from Tokyo either. Western
reporters whose ears had been accustomed to the provocative statements
from south Korea, cast grave doubts on this sudden silence and
ironically described south Korea in May and June as a "quiet land".
What
then did that silence mean? It was the silence before a storm. The
ensuing developments showed that this ominous silence following the
"defence line" statement was no more than a ruse to dull the vigilance
of the Korean people and "persuade" the world into believing the
possible "surprise attack of the north".
* 1. New York Times, June 26, 1950.
*2. Report on a press interview of AP correspondent King in Seoul, May 5, 1950. (Glenn
D. Paige, The United States and the Korean War, Tokyo, p. 89.)
*3. David W. Conde, An Untold History of Modern Korea, Vol. II, Tokyo, p. 77; Dispatch
of US reporter Andrew Rohs from Seoul.
*4. AP, Seoul, May 10, 1950; New York Times, May 11, 1950.
the
US military administration entered a graver stage from 1949. Production
was totally destroyed and the currency inflation was uncontrollable.
Prices rose sky-high. Compared with 1936, they rose on an average 725
times in 1948, 831 times in April 1949 and 909 times in July of that
year.
Economic ruin directly affected the people’s life, roused the
broader masses to an anti-US, national salvation struggle, and thus
aggravated the political crisis of the Syngman Rhee "government".
The
mounting spirit of the people for an independent peaceful
reunification of the country gave birth to the anti-Syngman Rhee forces
within the south Korean "National Assembly", including the "group for
north-south negotiation". An anti-"government" movement started in
connection with a vote of "non-confidence in the government", throwing
Syngman Rhee’s despotic regime into "confusion".
Such political and
economic crisis of south Korea caused great apprehension and unrest
among the American rulers who were hurrying with war preparations in
the finishing stage. Concerning this, Truman wrote in his Memoirs: "I
was deeply concerned over the Rhee government’s lack of concern about
the serious inflation that swept the country. Yet we had no other choice
but to support Rhee."* l
To clear away the "deep concern" of the US
rulers, State Secretary Ache-son sent a memorandum on April 7 to
Syngman Rhee, warning him of the need to tide over the political and
economic crisis. He wrote to the effect that so long as south Korea
failed to check economic inflation and conduct a general election in
May, the United States would reexamine its military and economic aid to
south Korea and probably feel the need to modify it. *2
Pressing Situation That Brooks No Further Duration
The
silence before a storm cannot last long. A ruse to blind the world’s
eye and stop the world’s ear has its limit of effect. More, a pressing
situation had to be created there where the US imperialists and the
Syngman Rhee-led rulers had to hurry over their war provocation. It was
occasioned by two causes: one was the political and economic crisis of
the Syngman Rhee "government" on the verge of total collapse, and the
other was the "imminency" of liberation of Taiwan by the Chinese
people.
The south Korean economy which had rushed along the road of ruin under
160
*1. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. II, New York, p. 329.
*2. Leon Gordenker, The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification of Korea, p. 173.
Mindful
of the master’s warning, Syngman Rhee urged the "national assemblymen"
to work out a well-balanced budget, dismissed 60,000 government
employees and pursued a "retrenchment policy". This policy, however,
proved of no avail; it rather worsened the catastrophic economic
situation. Particularly, from the year when one million sok of rice was
shipped to Japan by Mac Arthur’s "order", prices were boosted to the
sky in south Korea. In Seoul the rice supply petered out and two-thirds
of its citizens went hungry.
To tide over the political crisis the "election" which would be allegedly
161
postponed
till June or November was conducted on May 30. But its results showed a
miserable defeat of Syngman Rhee. Prior to the "election" he had
suppressed even the middling forces, to say nothing of the
oppositionists, branding them as "Communists". He had committed such a
fascist atrocity as jailing 30 opposition candidates. This produced a
boomerang effect on the "election". Out of the 210 seats he barely
managed to get 47, even raking up all his supporters. Only 12 sided with
him in the "National Council for the Promotion of Independence".
The
convocation of the new National Assembly clearly showed that Syngman
Rhee was meeting his doom. Holding the overwhelming number of seats, the
oppositionists strongly demanded the amendment of the Constitution, the
curtailment of Presidential authority and the institution of a
responsible Cabinet, thus landing tyrant Syngman Rhee on the precipice
of political ruin. He had to take emergency measures immediately.
What
could he do in such a situation? The only outlet for him was to ignite a
war as soon as possible. As US writer Hershel Meyer wrote, he "hung his
last hope of survival on war". Driven to the wall, Syngman Rhee came to
the conclusion that war alone could get him out of the precipice and
clear away all the political and economic crises.
Thus he hurriedly
sent M. Chang to Washington who reported the "ruinous state of the
government" to the US master on June 12 and "asked for urgent US aid" to
overcome that crisis.*!
As to the "urgent US aid" begged for by
Syngman Rhee at the time, the New York Herald Tribune exposed that south
Korean ambassador M. Chang had given a warning report to a State
Department dignitary on his country being on the brink of collapse and
begged for some guarantee for US armed intervention in case of war.*2 In
other words, the "urgent aid" asked for by Syngman Rhee from his US
master was the demand for an early execution of the war plan.
Having
received the urgent message from Syngman Rhee, Truman who had no other
way but to back Syngman Rhee, as he had put it himself, now had to check
the fall of the Syngman Rhee "government" and, to this end, he had to
quickly enkindle a planned war. M. Chang’s report on the ruinous state
of the Syngman Rhee "government" thus marked an important occasion for
the US government to go into war provocation earlier.
. New York Herald Tribune, June 14, 1950.
162
*2. New York Herald Tribune, June 26, 1950.
There
were also some other factors that made the Truman Administration jump
into the Korean war. One factor was the mounting sentiments for
peaceful reunification in Korea.
The Enlarged Meeting of the Central
Committee of the Democratic Front for the Reunification of the
Fatherland convened on June 7, 1950 on the insistence of President Kim
II Sung seriously discussed the prevailing situation and adopted an
"appeal for promoting measures for the peaceful reunification of the
fatherland". The appeal proposed to hold a general election throughout
north and south Korea from August 5 to 8, 1950 and establish a united
independent democratic central government by forming a united supreme
legislative body. To discuss the question of the establishment of a
central guidance committee for this general election, the appeal also
proposed to convene a consultative meeting of the representatives of
north and south Korean political parties and social organizations in
Haeju or Kaesong between June 15 and 17.
On June 11 three persons
left Ryohyon station for Seoul to convey this appeal reflecting the
ardent aspiration of the Korean people for national reunification, to
all political parties, social organizations, scientific, cultural,
educational, press, publishing and religious organs and individuals in
south Korea and to the "UN Commission on Korea". But these envoys of
peace failed to convey the appeal as they were illegally arrested by the
Syngman Rhee clique.
In an effort to evade a civil war and realize
the peaceful reunification even under such a situation, President Kim II
Sung called a meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly
of the DPRK on June 19 and suggested it propose to the "National
Assembly" of south Korea that national reunification be achieved by
unifying the Supreme People’s Assembly of the DPRK and the "National
Assembly" of south Korea into a single legislative body for all Korea.
Nonetheless,
the US imperialists and Syngman Rhee who had long planned for
"reunification by force" made Chae Pyong Dok and the Director of the
Public Information Bureau threaten the south Korean people by issuing a
treacherous statement that "north-south negotiations and peaceful
reunification were impermissible" and that "anyone attending a meeting
of north-south representatives in response to the proposal of the
DFRF...would be branded as a traitor". From June 9 they placed the whole
of south Korea up to the 38th parallel under a "special inspection
watch" to hamper the convocation of a joint
163
meeting of
north-south representatives.*! The door of peaceful reunification was
thus closed tight due to the war policy followed by a pack of traitors
to the nation. *2
*\.AP. Seoul, June 10. 1950. (From Rodong Sinmun on
June 13, 1950.) *2. Following the war policy of the US government, the
Syngman Rhee "government" was awake only to the "northward march for
unification". It had not any other plan for reunification. It cracked
down on the slightest move for peaceful reunification, describing it as
an "expression of infidelity". In this connection, even the "UN
Commission on Korea" made it clear that the Syngman Rhee "government"
had not only failed to participate in any official discussion with the
north for reunification but even opposed the unofficial efforts for it.
It could not refrain from reporting that the Rhee "government" had made
clear its position of regarding any proposal for north-south
discussion, whether unofficial or tentative, as a manifestation of
infidelity-. ("UNCK Reports," December 1949-September 1950.)
No
obstructive manoeuvres, however, could stem the powerful trend towards
peaceful reunification and save the hard-pressed Syngman Rhee
"government" from collapse. The prevailing situation forced the
Washington masters to take urgent measures. The only way to get Syngman
Rhee out of the predicament was to quickly carry out their original
plan and burn up all the "ominous symptoms" in the flames of war. In his
An Untold History of Modern Korea, David W. Conde, who had once served
as Chief of the Film Section, the Information and Education Department,
the MacArthur Command, drew the following conclusion: ...It would be
most reasonable to figure that war was the last resort of crazy Syngman
Rhee. As the last game the Syngman Rhee "government" drove the country
into a civil war, unable to keep itself steady in face of economic
destruction, domestic unrest, harassment by the hostile National
Assembly since his defeat in May, and then the people’s leanings towards
the peace statement of the north.*i This view of Conde’s may be said to
have rather concentrically explained why the US imperialists and the
Syngman Rhee clique had rushed at war.
Another important factor that
made the US hurriedly ignite the Korean war was the supposed
information that the Chinese people were going to liberate Taiwan in
the summer.
According to the confession made by Mun Hak Bong, the
former political advisor to Syngman Rhee, the US government, having
received information that
164
the Chinese people would launch an
operation for the liberation of Taiwan in July at the latest, decided to
get on with it and advanced the date of the provocation of the Korean
war to June. (That information was of doubtful accuracy. It might have
been based on assumption or fabricated.) Mun Hak Bong’s testimony that
they had turned to the supposed information about the move for the
liberation of Taiwan was substantiated by the then US press reports. The
New York Times reported that around the mid-June of 1950 the Chinese
People’s Liberation Army had wound up all preparations for an "invasion
of Taiwan" with its Third Field Army as a mainstay. In his The United
States and the Korean War Glenn D. Paige quoted the information obtained
by the US Information Bureau by the late spring of 1950 as saying that
the Chinese Communist Party had been contemplating the invasion of
Taiwan which would be started some day in summer.*2 In mid-June, with
the outbreak of the Korean war near at hand, American newspapers let
out the secret of their government all at once by reporting that the
Department of Defence was going to strongly demand in the third week of
June 1950 the President to repeal his resolution on Taiwan (His
nonintervention policy for Taiwan made public on January 5-Qitoter)*3
What
did this report of the US newspapers suggest? It only signified
firstly that both the "defence line" statement and the statement on the
"nonintervention policy for Taiwan" issued by the US rulers in January
had been a sheer lie and proceeded virtually from a ruse to invent a
pretext for occupying Korea and Taiwan which were allegedly outside the
"defence line", and secondly that the US rulers had interlinked the
Korean and Taiwan questions from the start and put rather greater weight
on them than Japan, Loochoos and the Philippines within the "defence
line". In those days no one had ever issued a statement about
"liberating" Japan, Loochoos and the Philippines; there had not been and
could not be the slightest sign of it. In other words, these regions
within the "defence line" had been too much "secure" for the United
States to issue a threatening statement about their "protection from
invasion". Now it is clear that the main object of the "defence line"
statement was to ensure the "security" of Taiwan and south Korea, not
that of the regions within the "defence line" and, on that pretext, to
fabricate "invasion" from the Chinese mainland and north Korea and then
completely occupy Taiwan and the whole of Korea by force of arms.
Indicative of this is Truman’s notorious June 27 statement in which he
officially proclaimed the armed intervention of the US naval and air
forces in the Korean war and ordered the Seventh Fleet to Taiwan to
occupy it.
165
All this provides ample grounds for saying that
when the US rulers obtained the information about the "plan for
Taiwan’s liberation" they did not confirm its accuracy but schemed to
provoke the Korean war before the Chinese people could go into an
operation for the liberation of Taiwan.
* 1. David W. Conde, An
Untold History of Modern Korea, Vol. II, Tokyo, p. 104. *2. Glenn D.
Paige, The United Slates and the Korean War, Tokyo, p. 80.
*3. Washington Post, June 22, 1950. New York Herald Tribune, June 24, 1950.
As
can be seen from the above, the worst political and economic crisis of
the Syngman Rhee "government" in June plus the "plan for Taiwan’s
liberation" in June or July put the US in an awkward position where
they could no longer delay the provocation of war in Korea for the sake
of their two puppets in Asia. They decided to get out of that position
and tide over the two crises at the same time. They thought it was the
best policy to ignite a Korean war within June to secure the bridgehead
for aggression on the continent. When Dulles was leaving for Korea to
"inspect" it right before June 25 on an important mission for the
provocation of a Korean war, M. Chang implored for US armed intervention
in Korea. He also pleaded: "We want to see that Taiwan will be
protected by the United States because of its invaluable strategic
location."* That threw another light on the plan of the war provokers.
*
"M. Chang’s Message to Syngman Rhee. June 14, 1950." (Documentary
Evidences for the Provocation of a Korean Civil War by the US
Imperialists, p. 83.)
Four-Bigwigs Talk in Tokyo and Dulles* Tour of South Korea
Everything in Washington, Tokyo and Seoul went according to the plan for a Korean war worked out by the US imperialists.
The
urgent message on the "ruinous crisis of the Syngman Rhee government",
the begging for "armed intervention" and the alleged "Taiwan crisis"
did not allow the Truman Administration to put off a Korean war later
than June. They went into action at once. A tense atmosphere hung over
Washington. Two days after Truman received M. Chang’s report, he
decided to rush the military and administrative big shots to Tokyo and
Seoul, who would act for him and inform him of the start of the
"northward march" after ultimately mak-
166
ing sure of the
preparations for war provocation on the 38th parallel. They were
Secretary of Defence Johnson, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff
Bradley and Presidential envoy Dulles who would leave Washington for
Tokyo respectively on the pretext of discussing a "peace treaty with
Japan" and go into an "accidental" huddle at the Mac-Arthur Command.
This was how the "Tokyo four-man talk" was arranged.
Now what was the
mission of these four bigwigs and what did they discuss at the Tokyo
talk? The important phase of it was disclosed by US correspondents in
Tokyo who had often caused trouble at the time by divulging the secrets
of the MacArthur Command. The New York Times wrote that the
confidential nature of the talk showed they were discussing rather a
very important problem than such everyday affairs as the conditions of
barracks and the progress of training.*! An AP report from Tokyo said
that the loss of Taiwan would gravely threaten the US defence line in
the Far East.*2 The New York Times dated June 20 reported bluntly that
General MacArthur, too, seemed to fully share the view on the
impossibility of setting the Japanese question apart (from the Korean
and Taiwan questions-Quote r). ••• It added that accordingly, they must
have discussed the Korean or Taiwan question.*3 Meanwhile, Johnson,
back to Washington from Tokyo, said in his June 24 statement that he had
inspected every important unit in the Far East and grasped the real
state of affairs.*4 The above news reports and Johnson’s statement
indicate that the main subject of the Tokyo talk was not the question of
a "peace treaty with Japan" as alleged by Truman but the military
affairs concerning the provocation of the Korean war.
That talk was
held for five days after M. Chang had informed the US imperialists of
the "ruinous state of the Syngman Rhee government’1 and asked them for
an immediate armed intervention. There the four big shots discussed the
Korean and Taiwan questions in caucus. They had to inspect the US army
units in Japan. All this suggests that they must have come to a definite
decision on all military, political and diplomatic questions necessary
for the all-out armed intervention of the US troops in the Korean war to
be ignited by Syngman Rhee on their instruction, and that MacArthur
and Syngman Rhee must have received a certain directive respectively
for the start of war including the reinforcement of the Far Eastern
troops. That was why the New York Herald Tribune and New York Post
exposed that the four big shots had admitted the "absolute necessity of a
new positive policy" and immediately ordered a detail of US special
bombers, including the "newest and largest types", to the Far East.*5
167
*1.
New York Times, June 21. 1950. *2.AP, Tokyo, June 19, 1950. *3. New
York Times, June 20. 1950. *4. Washington Post, June 25, 1950. *5. New
York Post, June 28, 1950.
The four bigwigs’ mission and their
criminal plot hatched at the Tokyo talk were revealed in an ever more
glaring light by the south Korean tour of John Foster Dulles, a
notorious "hot war maniac" and "warmonger".
Dulles flew into south
Korea after receiving the information about the "ruinous state of the
Syngman Rhee government" and the "request for an urgent aid".*I
According to M. Chang’s report to Syngman Rhee, Dulles came to south
Korea with "a big say in preparing and deciding the Far Eastern policy
of the US State Department".*2 The motive of his visit to south Korea
and the mighty power conferred upon him are enough to show the
aim of that visit.
In
view of the testimonies given by Kim Hyo Sok, the former Interior
Minister of the Syngman Rhee "government", and Mun Hak Bong, the then
advisor to the "CIC", it can be said that the mission of Dulles was to
examine the war preparations of Syngman Rhee, give him a specific
directive concerning the provocation of the civil war, outline the
course of action after the outbreak of war, and thus bring about a
"decisive turn" in the Far Eastern policy of the United States.
David
W. Conde offered a detailed comment on the meaning of the "decisive
turn in the Far Eastern policy of the United States", about which M.
Chang had said. He wrote to this effect: In view of the then situation
prevailing in Korea and China, the only likely "decisive turn" must
have meant that the US policy would deliver Chiang Kai-shek instead of
admitting the victory of the Chinese revolution and would give Syngman
Rhee supremacy over the whole of Korea. This "decisive turn" implied the
large-scale positive intervention of the US troops.*3
*1. New York Herald Tribune, June 26, 1950.
*2. "M. Chang’s Message to Syngman Rhee, June 14, 1950" {Documentary Evidences for
the Provocation of a Korean Civil War by the US Imperialists, p. 82.)
*3. David W. Conde, An Untold History of Modern Korea, Vol. II, Tokyo, p. 95.
168
On
arriving in Seoul, Dulles started bustling about to fulfil his mission.
Taking puppet National Defence Minister Sin Song Mo and others along,
he first went to the 38th parallel for "inspection". After looking out
over the defences of the northern half and inspecting the deployment of
the south Korean puppet troops on the 38th parallel (In his "souvenir
picture" taken on the spot at the time, Dulles assumes the posture of
signalling the attack on the north, with an operation map spread before
him), Dulles said before the "ROK" army men as follows: "No strong enemy
whatever would stand against you. But I hope you will strive ever
harder because the day is not so far off when you’ll have to display
your great might for your own sake."*i
That was June 18, a week
before the outbreak of the Korean war. But at that time many people were
not clear about how and when the "ROK" army, praised as the "first-rate
army in Asia", would "display its might". More, they never thought the
"northward march", hinted by him would start only a week after his
harangue.
On the 19th, Dulles, speaking for the first time to the
south Korean "National Assembly" in whose election Syngman Rhee had been
a loser, blustered: "The eyes of the free world are upon you."
Expressing the readiness of the United States to "give the moral and
material support" to south Korea which was fighting against communism,
he concluded his speech with the following words: "You are not alone.
You will never be alone so long as you continue to play worthily your
part in the great design for the freedom of human beings."*2 Syngman
Rhee for his part pledged before Dulles at the "National Assembly": "We
will win back the free world with a hot war if we lose the cold war
because of our laziness. And we will fight till the Communists perish..
.."*3
Dulles’ speech at the south Korean "National Assembly" was "a
statement confirming the official stand of the US policy toward south
Korea".*4 It was said that Dulles’ speech had been examined in advance
by Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, and
especially the last words had been carefully written by the officials of
the State Department. This means that through Dulles’ mouth the US
government egged on the south Korean puppets to a conflict with
communism and officially hinted to them an all-out support to be given
by the United States to south Korea even without an official commitment
when Syngman Rhee would ignite a civil war. A carefully worded
expression of it was Dulles’ words of encouragement to the south Korean
puppets, that they would never be alone so long as they continued to
play worthily
169
their part in the US design for the "freedom of human beings".
The
data released later show that Dulles met Syngman Rhee and Sin Song Mo
at the US embassy housed in the Pando Hotel, Seoul, and re-examined the
"northward expedition plan" behind closed doors. He instructed them to
"attack north Korea along with the counter-propaganda that north Korea
had invaded south Korea first" as planned and hold out for two weeks at
any cost. He reaffirmed: "If you will hold out only for two weeks, the
United States will complain that north Korea attacked south Korea, and
see to it that the United Nations can mobilize ground, naval and air
forces under its name."*5 Then Dulles animated the stooges with the
words that if a war would go as planned "the communists would eventually
lose their domination over north Korea".*6
Such was the ulterior
object of Dulles’ tour of south Korea made from the 17th to the 20th on a
"special mission" as said by Glenn D. Paige.
*]. "Kim Hyo Sok’s
Testimony. September 26, 1950." (Documentary Evidences for the
Provocation of a Korean Civil War by the US Imperialists, p. 127.) *2.
"Proceedings of the South Korean National Assembly" (Translated from the
documents of the US embassy). Glenn D. Paige, The United States and
the Korean War, Tokyo, p. 82.
*3. "Proceedings of the South Korean National Assembly" (From the documents of the US embassy).
*4.
Glenn D. Paige, The United Stales and the Korean War, Tokyo, p. 82. *5.
"Kim Hyo Sok’s Testimony, September 26, 1950." (Documentary Evidences
for the Provocation of a Korean Civil War by the US Imperialists, p.
128.) Famous Australian writer Burchett wrote: "There can be no
reasonable doubt that the visit of Dulles was to give the signal for the
attack to be launched and to assure Syngman Rhee on the highest level
that the moment the attack started, American air and naval support would
be forthcoming." (This Monstrous War, p. 114.)
*6. AP, June 19,
1950, Seoul. The New York Times dated June 20, 1950 carried Dulles’
warning words at the "National Assembly": "Compromise with communism
would be to take the road leading to disaster." Evidently this was an
urge to turn down the June proposal of the Republic for independent
peaceful reunification and a signal for starting the "march north".
While
Dulles was busy urging the south Korean puppet army and police to a
"northward march" and giving Syngman Rhee detailed war instructions, a
grand military parade of the US 8th Army was held, reviewed by Johnson,
170
Dulles making final examination of the plan of invasion of the northerbn
half of the Republic in a trench along the 38th parallel(June 18, 1950)
Bradely
and MacArthur, in the square in front of the Imperial Palace in Tokyo.
(Asahi Shimbun dated June 20, 1950.) This represented a challenge to and
military pressure on the Korean people in their efforts for peaceful
reunification and a provocative act aimed at implying what "positive
action" would be like.
The aim of Dulles’ visit to Seoul and his
mission were exposed to the full in his farewell messages to Syngman
Rhee and "Foreign Minister" Rim Pyong Jik. On June 20 he wrote to
Syngman Rhee: "/ attach great importance to the decisive role which your
country can play in the great drama that is unfolding." *\ To Rim
Pyong Jik he expressed the “hope for mutual help between the two
countries" and concluded the letter with the meaningful words: "Above
all, I appreciated the opportunity of discussing with you and with
President Rhee some of the hard problems that we face, problems that
will require courageous and bold decisions. " *2
Back in Tokyo,
Dulles immediately went into a huddle with MacArthur, Johnson and
Bradley. On the basis of his report on the real state of affairs in
south Korea, they fixed the date for the start of war*3 and finally
confirmed the role to be played by the puppet Syngman Rhee troops in the
provocation of war and the action programme of the US ground, naval and
air forces in the Far East. Then they declared to the world: "The
United States will soon take some positive action."*4
At the time the
world people were not clear on Dulles’ impending "great drama", on
their "hard problems requiring courageous and bold decisions" and on the
forthcoming "positive action" of the United States. Their true meaning
could be understood only by a few who would play the "decisive role" in
that "drama" and those who would organize that "positive action
requiring courageous and bold decisions".
Only several days later
could the world public find a clue to all of those mysterious words. As
laid bare by US correspondent Stone, it was the "outbreak of the Korean
war on June 25 and the June 27 commitment of the US government to
large-scale intervention against communism in the Pacific area."*5
*1. Who Began the Korean War? edited by the Committee for A. Democratic Far Eastern
Policy, Tokyo, p. 41.
*2.
"John Foster Dulles’ Letter to Rim Pyong Jik, June 20, 1950".
(Documentary Evidences for the Provocation of a Korean Civil War by the
US Imperialists, p. 88.) *3. It was said that Chief of the "AMAG" in
Korea had explained to Syngman Rhee why
172
June 25 had been fixed
as the date of war as follows:"We have chosen the 25th and this
explains our prudence. It is Sunday. It’s the Sabbath for both the
United States and south Korea, Christian states. No one will believe we
have started a war on Sunday. In short, it is to make people believe
that we are not the first to open a war." June 25 was the last Sunday of
that month. There was no alternative for them but to choose that day
for a Sunday. It was June 12 that they had received Syngman Rhee’s
request for urgent aid. On the 14th they sent Dulles to south Korea. He
left south Korea on the 21st. Johnson and Bradley left Japan on the
23rd. So the 25th was only Sunday left in June. *4. After a talk Dulles
said to the reporters that "the United States predicted its ‘positive
action’ to preserve peace in the Far East." (New York Times, June 22,
1950.) *5.1.F. Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War, Vol. I,
Tokyo, p. 37.
The 38th Parallel on the Eve of June 25
The situation at the 38th parallel grew tenser all of a sudden from the day the war plotters were back after the Tokyo talk.
But
it had remained tense since January 1950 when the revised plan for the
provocation of a new war had been ratified. Under this plan the puppet
army underwent a great change in its disposition in the whole front area
south of the 38th parallel, and a huge armed force was getting ready
for attack on the northern half.
The Second and Fifth Divisions of
the "ROK army" which had been spread out in Taegu, Taejon, Kwangju and
other areas to "mop up" the guerrillas under the "rear security plan"
were moved in the direction of Kaesong, Seoul and Uijongbu and, together
with the "Metropolitan Division", were deployed as the operational
reserves of the Eighth, Sixth, Seventh, and First Divisions and the
Seventeenth Regiment in the forward area. At the end of April 1950 the
two "combat headquarters" were formed to command the five divisions
deployed in the first echelon along the 38th parallel, and Chae Pyong
Dok, Chief of the General Staff of the puppet army, and Kim Sok Won were
appointed as their commanders respectively, one on the eastern front
and the other on the western front.*l And the artillery and other units
of technical services which had been under the direct control of the
Army were transferred to the divisions in the first echelon, and all
military supplies and equipment were concentrated on Seoul and Uijongbu.
As testified by MacArthur at the joint hearings of both Houses in April
173
1951,
the "ROK army" had "concentrated all its supplies and equipment on the
area along the 38th parallel", its units had made offensive
dispositions, not "defensive ones in depth," and thus the whole region
between the "38th parallel and Seoul" had been turned into a
"logistical area".*2
*1. "Mun Hak Bong’s Radio Address, July 21,
1950." (Documentary Evidences for the Provocation of a Korean Civil War
by the US Imperialists, p. 104.)
*2. Mac Arthur Hearings, pp. 230-31.
As early as May 19, a month before the outbreak of the war, Johnson,
Chief of the ECA in Korea, said before the US House Appropriations
Committee that "100,000 men and officers of the ROK army armed with US
weapons and trained by Americans have wound up preparations for entering
a war at any moment." (The United States Defeated, Tokyo, p. 17.)
Johnson’s speech, along with Mac Arthur’s testimony, bespoke that the US
imperialists had already wound up war preparations long before June 25
and had been ready to go into the "northward march" at any moment upon
orders. Thus it exploded the spurious propaganda spread by those on
their payroll that the "ROK army" had been in a defensive posture on the
eve of June 25 and that it had failed to make any war preparations.
Willoughby,
director of the Information Department of the MacArthur’s Headquarters,
confessed that when a war was impending...most of the Syng-man Rhee
troops had already virtually been deployed along the 38th parallel.*
*WiIloughby, MacArthur 1941-195!, p. 354.
The
deployment of the 100,000 -strong force of the south Korean puppet army
along the 38th parallel in an offensive posture meant that an
aggression could be launched at any moment by the war incendiaries and
that the situation had reached the brink of war.
In such a tense
situation at the 38th parallel the People’s Army, the revolutionary
armed forces of the Republic, had to strengthen its stand of defence and
keep itself in full combat readiness to rout the aggressors at one
stroke.
President Kim II Sung taught as follows:
"After receiving
in early May 1950 the reliable information about the preparations for
attack on the north, the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea could take timely measures for repelling aggression."
Having
gained a scientific insight into the tense situation created due to the
aggressive machinations of the US imperialists, President Kim II Sung
gave
174
orders to make full preparations for crushing the enemy’s surprise attack.
Following
the President’s teaching, the Korean People’s Army and Security Forces
strove hard to increase their combat capacities, replenishing their
ranks and strengthening their combat and political training. At the same
time, they took measures from May to accommodate themselves to a state
of emergency, keeping the strictest watch on the suspicious movements
of the enemy. But it was in every sense the strengthening of a defensive
stand aimed to smash the enemy’s invasion. That was why Roberts, the
former head of the "AMAG", had to admit before reporters on May 28: "At
present there is no sign of the reinforcements of the north Korean army
along the 38th parallel."*!
The war provokers considered this "no
sign of the reinforcements" of the People’s Army along the 38th parallel
to be the "golden opportunity" for their action. Dulles, back to Tokyo
after inspecting the 38th parallel, must have reported this state of
affairs and advised that it would be the best policy to send the signal
flare for the northward march on June 25 as planned.
Against such a
background of movements, the 38th parallel was in a touch-and-go
situation on the eve of June 25. According to Burchett, progressive
Australian writer, "American staff officers were sitting on the
parallel, American reconnaissance planes were constantly flying over the
area along the 38th parallel, patrols were always probing across the
38th parallel, and a highly-organized espionage network was active
behind that line".*2
According to the testimony of Han Su Hwan, the
former operation officer and political instructor of the Seventeenth
Regiment of the puppet army, who hung out a white flag, the former
"northward expedition plan" or an ABC operational plan which would have
been decided at a divisional commanders’ meeting in May and put into
effect by orders of a battalion commander was cancelled, and there came
down instead a new plan named the "stratagem of the general
headquarters" for the whole "ROK army" to engage exclusively in training
for an offensive warfare.
With June 25 drawing nearer, the officers
of the "ROK army" headquarters "visited the front line in greater
frequency", and Mez Stragy and seven other US military advisors were out
to build up a war system, controlling the Seventeenth Regiment. To
stiffen the morale of the puppet armymen, they extolled the "ROK army"
equipped with the newest weapons as a "world’s first-rate army". They
even blustered: "You must not only capture north Korea and regain the
lost territory but occupy Manchuria, once a part of your territory."
According to the testimony of Han Su Hwan, ever since June 23 when the
175
UN
military supervisor left Seoul after inspecting the Seventeenth
Regiment (participants in the Tokyo four-man talk also left for
Washington that day), the "situation of the front line had grown so
acute" that all men could sense "some unusual things would happen". The
24th was Saturday, but all the men including the officers were confined
to the barracks and ordered to keep themselves on a stand-by alert.*3
According
to the report of the Home Ministry of the Republic, from 22:00 on June
23 the puppet army units at the 38th parallel which had been in a "state
of emergency" went into a large-scale artillery bombardment over the
area north of the 38th parallel. By the 24th they had fired more than
700 of 105-mm howitzer and 81-mm mortar shells. This bombardment
launched in the wake of the Tokyo talk was the preliminary firing
signalling the start of an all-out armed aggression of the US
imperialists and the prelude to their "great drama" and "positive
action".
*1. Roberts’ words on May 28, 1950 were recorded by AP reporter King. (Glenn D.
Paige, The United Stales and the Korean War, Tokyo, p. 89.)
*2. Wilfred Burchett, This Monstrous War, p. 121.
*3. "Han Su Hwan’s Testimony, June 29, 1950." (The Documentary Evidences for the
Provocation of a Korean Civil War by the US Imperialists, pp. 90-93.)
On
June 21, 1950 Jang To Yong, Director of the Information Department of
the puppet army, sent spies into the northern half, while instructing
Pack Son Yop, First Divisional Commander, and Yun Jung Gun, Commander of
the Ninth Regiment in Pochon, to keep a peak state of vigilance. On
June 23 the field intelligence unit of the puppet army infiltrated its
agents into Tosong-ri and Ryangmun-ri in the forward area to spy out the
mood of the people and, on June 24, Kim Pyong Ri, chief of the head
office of the intelligence unit of the puppet army, crept into Tosong-ri
himself. But they reported that they were "all unable to collect any
data foreshadowing the June 25 event".*!
It is believed that the
"northward expedition plan" by "orders of a battalion commander",
exposed by Han Su Hwan, meant a war plan for 1949 or a plan for
intrusion on the 38th parallel, while the new "stratagem of the general
headquarters" signifying a new war provocation plan for 1950 revised
with an all-out armed intervention of the US troops as its backbone.
The
US imperialists and their stooges did not forget to exhibit a show of
veiling their aggressive nature by the very time they enkindled the war.
For one
176
thing, they spread a false rumour that on the night
of the 24th a banquet was arranged on the occasion of the opening of the
officers’ club of the Army Headquarters, where the "commanders from the
foremost area and most of the brass hats of the Defence Ministry and
Army Headquarters amused themselves late into the night". They also
insisted that the "state of emergency" was lifted on the 24th and there
was only one-third of the armed force in the barracks as all officers
and men were granted furlough or outings. This was a thinly-veiled trick
to "justify" their argument for the "armed attack of the north Korean
troops", shift the blame for the provocation of war on the Republic and
invent pretexts for their defeat in the war.
As disclosed by
Willoughby, all the south Korean troops were given warning and deployed
along the 38th parallel from a few weeks before the start of war.*2 And
how could it be possible for them to leave the foremost area undefended
when they allegedly knew about an "imminent attack of north Korea"?
More, it is hardly imaginable in a military sense that they should have
granted furlough or outings to two-thirds of the officers and men of
their front line units. It is also strange that the "state of emergency"
was lifted on the 38th parallel the very day after Dulles had
proclaimed the start of "positive action". The pure falsity of their
arguments is plainly visible from the humourous recollections of Ri
Song Ga, the former Commander of the Eighth Division of the "ROK army"
deployed on the eastern front. Concerning the dinner party arranged on
the occasion of the opening of the officers’ club of the puppet Army
Headquarters he said:"For the units in Seoul, it seemed another matter,
but for me, a front line divisional commander, it was different. We had
been in a state of emergency at that time. There had been a curfew
order, and we had to go into battle from the dawn t>/June 25 ". *3
*1. Collection of Army War History, Vol. I, Hara Bookshop, 1975, Tokyo, p. 26.
*2. Cosmopolitan, No. 12, 1951.
*3. The Tragedy of the Korean War, Sasanggye, No. 6, 1965, Seoul.
As
seen above, one who would ignite a war and the time of ignition were
decided and preliminary fire opened under the baton of the US to break
the calmness on the eve of the storm in the "quiet land of May and
June". All that they had to do now was to get the ground units to launch
an all-out offensive on orders of the MacArthur Command and the "AMAG".
A war would presently break out on the 38th parallel under the criminal
plot to plunge the
177
Korean people into a scourge of war, and the world public into the holocaust of another world war.
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